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NOTES
TWELVE INJURED MEN:
WHY INJURED JURORS SHOULD NOT
RECEIVE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COVERAGE FROM THE COURTS
COREY BARON†
INTRODUCTION
In 1923, Mary Rogers dutifully completed the most
honorable civic responsibility—jury duty.1 Due to the late hour,
the elevators in the courthouse were out of service, so she had to
take the stairs.2 When she descended the stairs, she fell and
fractured her hip.3 Thereafter, Ms. Rogers filed a workers’
compensation claim.4 It was the first time in United States
history that an injured juror sought workers’ compensation.5
Unfortunately for Ms. Rogers, the Industrial Commission of Ohio
denied her claim.6 Ms. Rogers’ case, however, went all the way to
†
Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2018, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., 2014, Binghamton University. The author expresses
warm gratitude to Professor Robert A. Ruescher for his guidance, insight, and
mentorship. The author is also grateful to the entire St. John’s Law Review editorial
board for its dedicated efforts throughout this process. Finally, the author is
thankful to his parents for their unwavering love and support.
1
Indus. Comm’n v. Rogers, 171 N.E. 35, 35 (Ohio 1930).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id. In this Note, “Workers’ Compensation” is used in lieu of “Workman’s
Compensation” and “Workmens’ Compensation.”
5
See Jochen v. County of Saginaw, 110 N.W.2d 780, 781 (Mich. 1961)
(describing the then-existing workers’ compensation precedent regarding jurors
across the United States); Rogers v. Indus. Comm’n, 27 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 256, 257
(C.P. Hamilton County 1928) (“The question as to whether or not jurors are entitled
to the benefits of the Workmen’s Compensation Act seems never to have been before
the courts of this state, nor of any of the states having workmen’s compensation
laws.”), aff’d sub nom. Indus. Comm’n v. Rogers, 170 N.E. 600 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929),
aff’d, 171 N.E. 35 (Ohio 1930).
6
Rogers, 27 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) at 257.
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the Supreme Court of Ohio, which granted her workers’
compensation claim on the grounds that she was an employee of
the county at the time she fell.7
Though the Rogers court set an initial precedent that jurors
should receive workers’ compensation,8 other courts have by and
large reached the contrary conclusion. That is to say, most
courts presented with this issue found that jurors were not
eligible for workers’ compensation.9 One such court felt the
answer was so obvious that it wrote a particularly memorable
opinion—composed of only four numbered points.10
There are, however, a minority of courts that reached the
same conclusion as the Rogers court.11 The opposing conclusions
exist because workers’ compensation claims are based on
individual state workers’ compensation statutes, which have
different statutory structures and applicable common laws.12 In

7
See Rogers, 171 N.E. at 36–37 (holding that Mary attained employment by
virtue of appointment for hire); see also Jochen, 110 N.W.2d at 781.
8
See Rogers, 171 N.E. at 36–37.
9
See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. Glassman, 341 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla.
1976) (“In holding respondent ineligible for workmen’s compensation benefits, we
align ourselves with the weight of authority in other jurisdictions.”); Jaskoviak v.
Indus. Comm’n, 785 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“The majority of cases
from other jurisdictions have answered this question by deciding that a juror is not
an employee.”); Wilson v. Georgetown County, 447 S.E.2d 841, 842 (S.C. 1994) (“The
majority rule is that a juror is not within the scope of workers’ compensation laws.”).
10
The Supreme Court of New Mexico wrote its opinion with incredible brevity.
The entire opinion follows:
{1} The question for decision: Is a juror who suffers an accidental injury
while in the performance of his duties as such entitled to an award of
compensation for his injury under the provisions of our Workmen’s
Compensation Law, 1953 Comp. § 59–10–1 et seq.?
{2} The learned trial judge said nay. So say we.
{3} The judgment will be affirmed.
{4} It is so ordered.
Seward v. County of Bernalillo, 294 P.2d 625, 625 (N.M. 1956) (internal citation
omitted).
11
See, e.g., Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 526–27 (Idaho 1990);
Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 206 (N.D. 1990); Bolin v.
Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805, 808 (Wash. 1990).
12
Robert A. Naragon, Note, Jurors as Nonvoluntary Employees Under
Workmen’s Compensation Law, 74 DICK. L. REV. 334, 335 (1970); David B. Torrey &
Lawrence D. McIntyre, Recent Developments in Workers’ Compensation and
Employers’ Liability Law, 51 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 749, 750 (2016). Bolin
also acknowledged this legal nuance. See Bolin, 785 P.2d at 807 (“This court must
interpret Washington’s statute, not those of other states. Under the language,
statutory scheme, and cases construing our act, we conclude that jurors are
employees.”) (emphasis added).
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fact, some states require all employers and employees to
participate in their workers’ compensation programs, some states
simply grant eligible employers and employees the option to
participate in their workers’ compensation programs, and some
states both require designated classes of employers and
employees to participate and allow other eligible classes to
participate at their discretion.13 As a result, “the direct effect of
[workers’ compensation] laws and case precedents outside of
their state of origin is limited.”14 Simply put, because the state
statutes and precedents vary, the legal conclusions should vary
too.
Those differences yielded inconsistent holdings as to whether
injuries sustained in the course of jury duty merit workers’
compensation coverage. Though claims regarding such injuries
are a unique subset of workers’ compensation cases, individuals
have brought a variety of workers’ compensation claims for
injuries sustained in the course of jury service. Some examples
include trampling by a crowd exiting a courthouse elevator,15
falling out of the jury box,16 enduring a car accident en route
home from jury service,17 and even contracting pneumonia during
the deliberation process.18
Though one state, Puerto Rico, and the federal government
specifically addressed this issue in their statutes,19 claimants in
states without such express statutory provisions had to litigate
the issue.20 Consequently, this body of case law has yielded four
different holdings: (1) jurors are eligible for coverage because of
how the statutes have been interpreted,21 (2) public policy

13
14
15
16

Naragon, supra note 12, at 335.
Id.; Torrey & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 750; see also Bolin, 785 P.2d at 807.
Metropolitan Dade County v. Glassman, 341 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 1976).
Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 142 (Cal. Ct. App.

1995).
17

Bolin, 785 P.2d at 805.
Bd. of Comm’rs v. Evans, 60 P.2d 225, 226 (Colo. 1936). The juror alleged that
he contracted pneumonia because, after the jury failed to reach a verdict by
midnight, he was compelled to lodge at the county jail on a small mattress absent
blankets. Id.
19
5 U.S.C.A. § 8101 (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-402 (West
2017); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 11, § 2 (2017).
20
Infra Parts II and III.
21
See, e.g., Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 206
(N.D. 1990).
18
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requires jurors’ eligibility,22 (3) jurors are not eligible for coverage
because of how the statutes have been interpreted,23 and
(4) public policy precludes jurors’ eligibility.24
New York, however, has not addressed whether jurors are
eligible for workers’ compensation through the court system.25 A
case on this issue would be one of first impression in New York.
Therefore, one cannot predict how New York courts would rule on
the issue, because on the one hand, the courts could strictly
follow the statute’s language and conclude that jurors are not
eligible for coverage.26 On the other hand, the policy of broadly
and liberally applying New York’s Workers’ Compensation Law27
could lead New York courts to, like other courts,28 rule that jurors
should receive coverage.29
22
See, e.g., Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 144 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995); Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 526–27 (Idaho 1990).
23
See, e.g., Jaskoviak v. Indus. Comm’n, 785 N.E.2d 1026, 1028–30 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003).
24
See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. Glassman, 341 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla.
1976).
25
On the other hand, New York’s Workers’ Compensation Board has addressed
this issue twice. N.Y. State Dep’t of Agric. & Mkts, 2006 WL 2848881, at *3 (N.Y.
Workers’ Comp. Bd. Sept. 22, 2006); Orange Cty. Home & Infirmary, 1988 WL
189663, at *1 (N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Bd. June 6, 1988). For different reasons, both
Workers’ Compensation Boards ruled that the claimant-jurors were ineligible for
workers compensation coverage. Compare N.Y. State Dep’t of Agric. & Mkts, 2006
WL 2848881, at *3 (holding that “as a matter of public policy New York State does
not allow jurors to be employees of a governmental entity whose cases they may be
judging”), with Orange Cty. Home & Infirmary, 1988 WL 189663, at *1 (holding that
a jury service “is in a manner similar to that of a militiaman serving the State as
neither have certain rights and privileges of other working men and women, such as
the choice as to work or not according to their own free will”) (internal quotations
omitted).
26
The statute provides coverage for specific groups of employment and
occupational diseases. N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 3 (McKinney 2017). Group 17,
which lists the employees that municipalities must cover, does not list jurors. Id.
Jurors could, however, fit in to Group 19, which grants municipalities the option to
cover employees not listed in Group 17. Id. Select jurors could also arguably fit in to
Group 16, which provides workers’ compensation coverage to those under
“employment by the state” when the state pays wages pursuant to employment. Id.
27
E.g., Neacosia v. N.Y. Power Auth., 649 N.E.2d 1188, 1191, 85 N.Y.2d 471,
476, 626 N.Y.S.2d 44, 47 (N.Y. 1995); Lemon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 528 N.E.2d
1205, 1207, 72 N.Y.2d 324, 326, 532 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (N.Y. 1988); Smith v.
Tompkins Cty. Courthouse, 459 N.E.2d 155, 156, 60 N.Y.2d 939, 941, 471 N.Y.S.2d
46, 47 (N.Y. 1983).
28
See Waggener, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144 (noting that covering jurors is “wholly
consistent with the broad purposes of the Act . . . .”) (emphasis added); Yount, 796
P.2d at 522 (noting that workers’ compensation law was to be “liberally construed”
and holding the court’s task was, in considering whether jurors should be covered,
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This Note argues that the legislature should add a provision
to New York’s Workers’ Compensation Act that expressly
precludes jurors from coverage.30
Such a provision would
comport with the policy underlying the statute, the statute’s
structure, and the statute’s language. Moreover, that legislative
provision would prevent the court from wasting the considerable
time and expense of grappling with other courts’ inconsistent
interpretations of workers’ compensation statutes and their
underlying policies.31 First, Part I of this Note provides an
overview of the workers’ compensation law and explores the
policies underlying the advent of workers’ compensation statutes.
Then, Part II surveys and presents the six methods for
determining whether jurors are entitled to workers’
compensation coverage. Finally, Part III discusses the need for
clarification by the legislature, while Part IV of this Note
evaluates the suggestion for an additional statutory clause that
explicitly precludes jurors from eligibility for workers’
compensation.
I.

THE FUNCTION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

Workers’ compensation is a statutory system that provides
comprehensive medical and financial benefits to employees who
suffer work-related injuries.32
The system benefits both
employers and employees; it grants injured workers medical
coverage and scheduled income benefits—regardless of their fault
in causing their injuries—and provides employers with immunity
from litigation and, therefore, the threat of compensatory and

“to ascertain if the provisions of the [workers’ compensation] statute[] are capable of
being so interpreted . . . .”).
29
This Note will discuss in greater detail how some courts, including New York,
interpret workers’ compensation statutes broadly, which can lead to finding coverage
for jurors in the interest of that policy. See infra Parts III and IV.
30
This Note does not, however, engage in a philosophical assessment as to
whether jurors should otherwise receive remuneration for injuries they sustain in
the course of performing jury duty. This Note’s discussion is strictly limited to the
concept of providing jurors with Workers’ Compensation coverage.
31
See Torrey & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 750 (explaining that, in the context
of Workers’ Compensation, state courts “often look to authority from other states”
when “no precedent of the jurisdiction is determinative”). See Part III for an
explanation of the states’ inconsistent jurisprudence.
32
Joan T.A. Gabel et al., The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and
Employer: An Opportunity for Restructuring the System, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 403, 403
(1998).
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punitive damages.33 The system creates a relationship between
employers and employees such that “benefits are shared in a way
that maximizes their joint profits . . . .”34
Put simply, the
combination of the employers’ strict liability for making Worker’s
Compensation payments and the employees’ limited ability to
collect damages act as a prearranged settlement for work-related
injury claims.35 The system operates on the basis that the costs
of the system will pass to the consumer.36
Workers’ compensation statutes resulted from the plights
faced by nineteenth century workers. Prior to the advent of
workers’ compensation, employees often refrained from testifying
against their employers because they feared retaliatory
Meanwhile, the typical legal defenses of
termination.37
contributory negligence, negligence of fellow employees, and
assumption of risk shielded employers from adverse judgments.38
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the substantial
increase in work-related accidents, an unfortunate byproduct of
industrial development, yielded a demand for an efficient
mechanism to compensate injured workers.39 That demand
caught the attention of state legislatures, which led to the
adoption of workers’ compensation statutes across the United
States.40 As long as workers’ compensation statutes remain in
effect, they reflect the need to protect workers engaged in
dangerous work.
II. THE SIX RATIONALES FOR CONCLUDING WHETHER A JUROR IS
ELIGIBLE FOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Barry Stevens was summoned to jury duty. He sat through
voir dire and was selected for trial. Unfortunately, on the first
day of the trial, Barry Stevens tripped, fell out of the jury box,
33

Id. at 403; Torrey & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 753.
Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 406–07.
35
Id. at 407; see Torrey & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 753.
36
Roger C. Henderson, Should Workmen’s Compensation Be Extended to
Nonoccupational Injuries?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 117, 119 (1969); Eugene Wambaugh,
Workmen’s Compensation Acts: Their Theory and Their Constitutionality, 25 HARV.
L. REV. 129, 130 (1911); Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 406.
37
Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 405.
38
Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of
Workers’ Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 775–76 (1982); Gabel et al., supra
note 32, at 405–406.
39
Epstein, supra note 38, at 775; Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 406.
40
Epstein, supra note 38, at 776; Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 406.
34
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and broke his wrist when the court adjourned for lunch.41 Barry
Stevens’ ability to reap the benefits of workers’ compensation
depends on the approach taken by the state in which he fell.42
The divergence in case law regarding jurors’ eligibility for
workers’ compensation benefits resulted from conflicting
interpretations of workers’ compensation statutes and their
underlying policies. In the Sections that follow, this Note
explores these different interpretations and policies as well as
express statutory provisions that address jurors.
A.

Statutory Mandates That Address Jurors’ Eligibility To
Receive Workers’ Compensation

The first approach is to expressly address jurors in workers’
compensation statutes. Only two workers’ compensation statutes
expressly provide that jurors are eligible for workers’
compensation.
First, Puerto Rico’s workers’ compensation
statute specifies that jurors have workers’ compensation coverage
“from the time they leave their homes until they return to them,
whether they have served as jurors or not.”43 Second, Maryland’s
workers’ compensation statute also requires that jurors receive
coverage.44
The U.S. federal statute operates in the same manner.
Indeed, Title 5 of the United States Code contains the federal
equivalent of a workers’ compensation statute; it provides
coverage for federal employees.45 Much like Puerto Rico’s and
Maryland’s statutes, the Code’s definitions section states that
each individual “serving as a petit or grand juror” is within the

41

I will use this hypothetical throughout this Note to illustrate the approaches
to and results from injuries sustained by jurors.
42
For the discussion of how this issue is handled in federal courts, see infra
Part II.A.
43
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 11, § 2 (2017).
44
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-402(b) (West 2017) (“The State shall secure
compensation for jurors by maintaining insurance with the Chesapeake Employers’
Insurance Company and paying to the Company the premiums set by the Board for
the Company as necessary to provide compensation for jurors.”). Interestingly,
Maryland passed that statute after the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Lockerman
v. Prince George’s County, held that jurors were not eligible for coverage. 377 A.2d
1177, 1183–84 (Md. 1977).
45
“The United States shall pay compensation as specified by this subchapter for
the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while
in the performance of his duty . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 8102 (2012) (emphasis added).
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definition of “employee.”46 Therefore, if Barry Stevens sustained
his injury in any of those jurisdictions, he would obtain workers’
compensation benefits.
B.

Statutory Interpretation

The second approach to this issue is to consider and interpret
the general language of the relevant statute. This is the courts’
most common approach to the issue.47 However, despite the use
of the same method, the state courts have come out on both sides.
This further muddies the water and, unfortunately, makes
uniformity nearly impossible.
1.

Finding Jurors Ineligible for Workers’ Compensation

By and large, courts construed workers’ compensation
statutes to conclude
jurors were ineligible for workers’
compensation.48 Some courts held so because jurors did not fit
the statutory definition of “employee.”49 Accordingly, courts often
found that jurors were not employees because there was no
contract for hire between jurors and the court system.50 Indeed,
the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that “[e]mployment
presupposes an agreement entered into between two parties. In
the relationship between a juror and the parish there is no
agreement.”51 By the same token, the Supreme Court of Colorado
46

5 U.S.C. § 8101 (2012).
See, e.g., Hicks v. Guilford County, 148 S.E.2d 240, 242–44 (N.C. 1966);
Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 206 (N.D. 1990); Bolin v.
Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805, 805–06 (Wash. 1990).
48
See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. Evans, 60 P.2d 225, 227 (Colo. 1936); Jaskoviak v.
Indus. Comm’n, 785 N.E.2d 1026, 1030 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 244.
49
See, e.g., Evans, 60 P.2d at 227 (noting that jurors are not specified in the
statute in the definition of employee); Silagy v. State, 253 A.2d 478, 479 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1969) (discussing lack of “broad coverage” provided in statute by virtue
of the statutory definition of “employee”); Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 244 (finding that the
workers’ compensation did not apply to injuries sustained by jurors because they did
not meet definition of employee).
50
See, e.g., Evans, 60 P.2d at 226 (“We cannot think the status of a juror is that
of an employee serving, to quote the statute, by ‘appointment or contract of hire,
express or implied.’ ”); Jaskoviak, 785 N.E.2d at 1028–29 (noting that the absence of
an employment agreement shows that a juror is not an employee); Lockerman v.
Prince George’s County, 377 A.2d 1177, 1181 (Md. 1977) (holding that “the normal
contractual incidents of the employer-employee relationship are required” for any
person to be covered under the Workers’ Compensation Act); Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at
244 (noting that juror’s services, are not “obtained or defined” by a contract of hire).
51
Jeansonne v. Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 11663 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/77); 354
So. 2d 619, 620. In Louisiana, the “parish” is the equivalent of the county. See
47
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concluded that jurors were not eligible for workers’ compensation
because “[t]he county does not negotiate with a citizen for his
services as a juror, nor does the citizen apply to the county for
such preferment.”52 Other courts have echoed that sentiment.53
Moreover, courts often find that jurors are not employees despite
claimants’ arguments that jurors are employees by virtue of
“appointment for hire.”54
Thus, if Barry Stevens were summoned to jury duty in any of
the preceding jurisdictions, he would not receive workers’
compensation coverage for his injury. His denial would be based
on any combination of the following: He would not meet the
statutory definition of an employee; he would not have a contract
underlying his service; he would not have attained the position
through appointment; he could not have applied for the position;
and he could not have negotiated his compensation.
2.

Finding Jurors Eligible for Workers’ Compensation

In three instances, courts have found, through construing
their state’s workers compensation statutes, that jurors are
eligible for coverage.55 First, the Supreme Court of Ohio found
that its statute covered jurors when it held that jurors were
“appointed . . . for hire,” even though jurors could not turn down
appointment, because the counties compensated jurors for their
services.56 Notably, the Ohio court found that jurors were not
within the “official of the state or of the county” exception to that

Louisiana Supreme Court History, LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT, http://www.lasc.org/
about_the_court/history.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2018).
52
Evans, 60 P.2d at 226.
53
See O’Malley’s Case, 281 N.E.2d 277, 279 (Mass. 1972); Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at
244.
54
See, e.g., Evans, 60 P.2d at 227 (finding that “in no conceivable sense” are
jurors appointed for hire); Jaskoviak, 785 N.E.2d at 1029 (deciding against
claimant’s argument that placement on the jury commission’s jury list amounted to
an appointment for hire); Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 244 (noting that the juror was neither
“appointed nor elected to his position of duty”). For an explanation of “appointment
for fire” see infra Part III.A.
55
See Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 206 (N.D.
1990); Indus. Comm’n v. Rogers, 171 N.E. 35, 37 (Ohio 1930); Bolin v. Kitsap
County, 785 P.2d 805, 807–08 (Wash. 1990).
56
See Rogers, 171 N.E. at 36–37 (“[T]he fact that the juror has no option to
decline such appointment [does not] render the appointment any less one for hire,
since theoretically the consideration provided by law for the service is adequate.”).
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state’s workers’ compensation coverage,57 because jurors’
decisions were not final and a judge could refuse to enter the
jury’s verdict.58
Second, the Supreme Court of North Dakota interpreted its
workers’ compenstation statute to determine that its statute
covered jurors. That court noted that the state’s workers’
compensation statute included “appointed officials” in its
definition of employees.59 The court then applied the state’s
common-law test for determining whether individuals were
“appointed officials,”60 which necessitated an analysis of whether
jurors possessed the traits of “officials of the state.”61 The court
concluded that jurors were eligible for workers’ compensation
because jurors possessed the traits of “state officials,” which
meant they were “appointed officials” within the statutory
definition of “employee.”62
Third, the Supreme Court of Washington also interpreted its
statute to determine its jurors were eligible for workers’
compensation.63 The court noted that the Washington workers’
compensation statute defined “employee” as including “officers of
the state.”64 Moreover, the statute only listed the excluded
categories of employment.65 Accordingly, the court reasoned that
jurors could be employees because they were not on the list of
exclusions.66 However, before it found that jurors could receive
coverage, the court answered the remaining questions of whether
they were “employees,” despite the involuntary nature of jury
57

Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36.
59
Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 202 (interpreting N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 65–01–
02 (West 2015).
60
The criteria for a finding that individuals are public officials required that
such people achieved their positions by election or appointment, were compensated
from public funds, and performed statutorily defined duties, of a continuous nature,
which related to the administration of state government. Id. at 202.
61
The court evaluated jurors’ “importance, dignity, and independence,” in
addition to the common-law “public officials” test, out of respect for the state
attorney general after the attorney general issued a report stating that those
characteristics are inherent in public officials. Id. at 204 (internal quotations
omitted).
62
See id. at 205 (concluding that jurors are public officials in the context of
workers’ compensation because “juror[s] fulfill[] all of the Jorgenson requirements”
and satisfy the “importance, dignity and independence test . . . .”).
63
Bolin v. Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805, 805 (Wash. 1990).
64
Id.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.08.185 (West 2017).
65
Bolin, 785 P.2d at 806; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.12.020 (West 2017).
66
Bolin, 785 P.2d at 806.
58
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service,67 and whether the county was the jurors’ “employer.”68
The court recognized the involuntary nature of jury service, but
stated Washington precedent dictated that even involuntary
employees were eligible for workers’ compensation,69 and found
that the county was the employer of jurors “by virtue of [the
jurors’] responsibility to the superior court.”70 Consequently, the
court held that Washington jurors were eligible for workers’
compensation coverage.71
Therefore, if Barry Stevens was summoned to jury duty in
Ohio, North Dakota, or Washington, he would be eligible to
receive workers’ compensation coverage for his injury. His
eligibility would be based on any combination of the following:
his position as a juror resulted from an “appointment for hire,”
the county can be the “employer” of jurors, his position is not one
that falls within Ohio’s “official of the state or county” statutory
exception, and at the same time, he met North Dakota’s
qualifications for “state officials.”
3.

Public Policy and Finding Jurors Eligible for Workers’
Compensation

In Waggener v. County of Los Angeles,72 public policy was the
exclusive justification for finding that jurors were eligible for
workers’ compensation. That case concerned an individual who,
while serving jury duty in a criminal trial, slipped and fell out of
the jury box. When the injured juror brought negligence and
premises liability claims against the county, the county sought
dismissal on the grounds that the Workers’ Compensation Act
“provide[d] the sole and exclusive forum for redress of plaintiff’s
complaints against the County.”73

67

Id.
Id. at 807.
69
Id. at 806.
70
Id. at 807.
71
Id. at 805, 807–08. The court then engaged in further statutory interpretation
to determine whether the specific injury to the plaintiff, a vehicle accident which
took place on the plaintiff’s commute from jury duty, met the statutory requirement
that the injury take place within the course of employment. The court found that,
because the statute obligated the county to pay for jurors’ transportation, the
accident was within the scope of employment. Id. at 808.
72
46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
73
Id.
68
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The court began its analysis by noting that there was
ambiguity as to whether the legislature meant for the California
Workers’ Compensation Act to cover jurors.74 Next, the court
acknowledged the existing case law on the issue and that the
authority overwhelmingly found that jurors were not eligible for
workers’ compensation.75 The court noted, however, that the
overwhelming majority reached that conclusion because the
jurors’ relationships to their counties “d[id] not fit squarely
within the common law definition of the employment
relationship.”76 The court then stated that it would not engage in
“rigid contractual analysis,”77 and declared that “an ‘employment’
relationship sufficient to bring the Act into play cannot be
determined simply from technical contractual or common law
conceptions of employment but must instead be resolved by
reference to the history and fundamental purposes underlying
the [workers’ compensation] Act.”78
The Waggener court stated that a holding contrary to the
weight of authority, providing coverage to jurors, was consistent
with the purpose of the Act—“to protect individuals against the
special risks of employment.”79 Likewise, the court said the
broad terms and definitions of the Act were consistent with an
intent for “comprehensive coverage.”80 In addition, the court
explained, in detail, the lengths to which jurors go to perform
jury service for the county and even pointed out that “the
common term for describing the work of a citizen called to sit on
a jury is ‘jury service.’ ”81
Finally, the court’s conclusion

74
See id. at 143 (“We are therefore called upon to determine whether a juror is
an employee for purposes of the Act in the absence of a specific pronouncement by
the Legislature.”).
75
See id. (“The foregoing cases uniformly conclude that jurors are not
employees, and are not subject to the provisions of their states’ respective workers’
compensation laws . . . .”).
76
Id. (emphasis added).
77
Id.
78
Id. (quoting Laeng v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 494 P.2d 1, 4–5 (Cal.
1972)).
79
Id.
80
See id. at 144 (“The Act intends comprehensive coverage of injuries in
employment. It accomplishes this goal by defining ‘employment’ broadly . . . .”).
81
See id. (explaining that jurors are subject to county control over almost every
aspect of their environment and noting that such control can be, in the case of
sequestration, “extreme”).
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exemplified its belief that jurors should, as a matter of policy,
receive workers’ compensation benefits for the service they
perform:
In sum, it is wholly consistent with the broad purposes of the
Act to place upon the County, which benefits from the unique
and invaluable services provided by jurors, the responsibility to
insure against injuries which they may sustain in rendering
such services to the County. Consequently, we conclude that a
juror who is injured in the course of performing his or her jury
service is an employee for purposes of the Act.82

In like manner, other courts have concluded that jurors
should receive workers’ compensation coverage based on public
policy.83 For example, in a decision reminiscent of Waggener, the
Supreme Court of Idaho noted the ever-present potential for
juror injury and stated that “anyone who ponders even shortly”
on the possibility of jury service would “feel greatly relieved” to
know that injured jurors are eligible for workers’ compensation.84
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Idaho concluded that it would
be “far better” for jurors to receive assurance that counties would
pay for medical expenses arising out of their service.85 In the
same vein, the Supreme Court of Washington stated that the
workers’ compensation statute was “better served” by providing
coverage to jurors.86
Therefore, if Barry Stevens sustained his injury in
California, Idaho, or Washington, he would receive workers’
compensation coverage and, based on those courts’ position
towards jurors, maybe even a thank you for his service.
4.

Public Policy and Finding Jurors Ineligible for Workers’
Compensation

In addition to, or in lieu of, statutory interpretation, courts
have relied on policy considerations to find that jurors are not
eligible for workers’ compensation. One such policy is that jurors
cannot be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits because
their sole function is to perform a civic duty. Several courts

82

Id. (emphasis added).
See Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 526–27 (Idaho 1990); Bolin v.
Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805, 807–08 (Wash. 1990).
84
Yount, 796 P.2d at 526.
85
Id.
86
Bolin, 785 P.2d at 807.
83
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subscribe to this theory.87 In fact, the Supreme Court of Colorado
typified this perspective when it explained the function of jury
service:
When a citizen is summoned to jury service he responds to
process running in the name of the people, which imports such
dignity that it commands respect, and is of such force that none
disobeys. By the majesty of the law, therefore . . . he becomes a
juror . . . . He functions as part of the judicial machinery, and is
as indispensable to its ongoing as is the judge of the court where
he serves.88

Thus, several courts respect this obligation and, based on
both its public and civic nature, treat it as a special circumstance
wholly separate from employment.
Courts have also relied on another policy justification for
precluding jurors from workers’ compensation coverage: jurors,
unlike the employees typically afforded workers’ compensation
coverage, do not volunteer to serve. Indeed, several courts held
that jury service was distinct from employment because jury
service was mandated by law, whereas workers’ compensation
was premised on voluntary consent to work.89 Therefore, if Barry
Stevens sustained his injury in a jurisdiction holding that jurors
are distinct from employees because jurors perform a civic duty
or are compelled to serve, he would not receive workers’
compensation benefits.

87
See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. Evans, 60 P.2d 225, 227 (Colo. 1936) (“The duty to
serve as a juryman is an obligation to the community in which he resides . . . .”)
(emphasis added); Metropolitan Dade County v. Glassman, 341 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla.
1976) (distinguishing jurors from county employees because jurors answer a calling
to perform their “duty”).
88
Evans, 60 P.2d at 226–27. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts also
surmised this theory quite well: “Jurors do not constitute an independent
organization or body within the judicial system. They perform legal functions
imposed upon them in the manner prescribed by law. (T)hey are an appendage, a
branch, an integral part of the court acting under the authority of the court.”
O’Malley’s Case, 281 N.E.2d 277, 279 (Mass. 1972) (internal quotations omitted).
89
See, e.g., Jaskoviak v. Indus. Comm’n, 785 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003) (noting that the claimant could not choose to decline jury duty); Jeansonne v.
Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 11663 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/77); 354 So. 2d 619, 620
(noting that jurors are “bound by statute to perform”); Lockerman v. Prince George’s
County, 377 A.2d 1177, 1182 (Md. 1977) (“It is plain that voluntary assent is wholly
lacking here because a citizen summoned for jury duty simply cannot decline to
appear and serve.”); Hicks v. Guilford County, 148 S.E.2d 240, 243 (N.C. 1966)
(analogizing jurors to witnesses testifying under subpoena).
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III. INCONSISTENCIES IN JURISPRUDENCE
When these six approaches are taken together, there are
clear inconsistencies in the courts’ rationales and conclusions.
Those inconsistencies are presented in this portion of the Note
for the purpose of illustrating why the issue should not be left to
the courts. What follows are examples of courts reaching
opposite conclusions even though they took similar approaches,
reviewed similar facts, interpreted similar statutory language,
applied similar rationales, and aimed to implement similar
policies.
A.

Whether Jurors Are Appointed

Courts have provided inconsistent conclusions as to whether
jurors are “appointed” to serve. Several courts found that jurors
are not appointed; rather, they perform a civic duty.90 In fact, the
Supreme Court of Colorado said that “[i]n no conceivable sense”
are jurors appointed.91 However, several other courts concluded
that jurors are appointed.92 In holding the latter, the Ohio
Supreme Court even specified the process by which jurors were
appointed: Candidates were selected by a jury commission to be
placed in a wheel; they were drawn out of the jury wheel as
needed; and “when drawn, their selection by the jury commission
bec[a]me[] a definite appointment . . . .”93 Similarly, when the
Supreme Court of Idaho held that jurors were appointed for hire,
it noted that Idaho had an “almost identical . . . process” to the

90
See Evans, 60 P.2d at 227 (stating that jury service is a duty stemming from
an obligation to the jurors’ community); Jaskoviak, 785 N.E.2d at 1029 (rejecting
claimant’s argument that placement on the jury commission’s jury list amounted to
an appointment for hire); Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 244 (noting that the juror was
“neither appointed nor elected to his position of duty”).
91
Evans, 60 P.2d at 227.
92
Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 203 (N.D. 1990);
see also Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 142, 144 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995) (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (West 2018)) (noting that the statutory
definition of “employee” includes “appointed paid public officers” before concluding
that jurors were employees).
93
Indus. Comm’n v. Rogers, 171 N.E. 35, 36 (Ohio 1930) (emphasis added).
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one discussed in Rogers.94 Likewise, the Supreme Court of North
Dakota reasoned that jurors were appointed through both the
selection process and the required “jurors’ oaths.”95
B.

Extent of Control Exercised over Jurors

Courts have relied on both jurors’ autonomy and the extent
to which jurors are subject to the control of others—typically the
court and the county—to both grant and deny workers’
compensation coverage. For example, some courts found that
jurors’ inability to decline service bolstered the conclusion that
jurors should not receive workers’ compensation. Those courts
noted that jurors are “bound by statute to perform,”96 that
citizens “summoned for jury duty simply cannot decline to appear
and serve,”97 and even analogized jurors to witnesses testifying
under subpoena.98 The Supreme Court of Washington, however,
disregarded that notion.99 Indeed, it held that “[t]he view that
jurors are not covered because their employment is involuntary
cannot be reconciled with the cases in this jurisdiction and those
of our sister states that citizens impressed into various kinds of
civic service may recover [workers’ compensation benefits].”100
Similarly, based on the premise that jurors lack control over
their duties, courts have also reached contrary conclusions
regarding whether jurors should receive workers’ compensation
coverage. For example, several courts reasoned that jurors
should receive workers’ compensation coverage because they are

94
Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 525 (Idaho 1990). The Yount court
went even further than the Rogers court when it provided the statutory basis for the
state’s juror appointment process. Compare id. at 525 n.7., with Rogers, 117 N.E. at
36.
95
Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 203.
96
Jeansonne v. Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 11663 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/77); 354
So. 2d 619, 620.
97
Lockerman v. Prince George’s County, 377 A.2d 1177, 1182 (Md. 1977); see
also Jaskoviak v. Indus. Comm’n, 785 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (noting
that the claimant could not choose to decline jury duty); Bd. of Comm’rs v. Evans, 60
P.2d 225, 226–27 (Colo. 1936) (noting that jurors are “selected,” “summoned,” and
are not “consulted as to whether or when [they] shall serve, or as to the duration of
[their] service . . . .”).
98
Hicks v. Guilford County, 148 S.E.2d 240, 243 (N.C. 1966).
99
Bolin v. Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805, 806 (Wash. 1990).
100
Id.
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subject to the control of the court.101 The Supreme Court of
Colorado, however, reasoned that jurors should not receive
coverage because they are subject to the control of the court.102
Conversely, courts have reached contrary conclusions
regarding whether jurors should receive workers’ compensation
coverage based on the premise that jurors are autonomous. On
the one hand, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reasoned
that jurors were not eligible for workers’ compensation because
they have extensive control over the performance of their
duties.103 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of North
Dakota concluded that jurors were eligible for compensation for
the same reason: jurors have extensive control of the
performance of their duties.104
Comparing Holmgren to Hicks presents a particularly clear
instance of the inconsistency in how courts determine whether
jurors are eligible for workers’ compensation. The extensive
analysis of juror independence in Holmgren mirrors the analysis
in Hicks,105 but the courts reached opposite conclusions as to

101
See, e.g., Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 144 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the County controls almost “each and every” aspect of the
juror’s “work environment” and “whereabouts”); O’Malley’s Case, 281 N.E.2d 277,
279 (Mass. 1972) (noting that court orders exercise “control and direction” over the
jurors); Indus. Comm’n v. Rogers, 171 N.E. 35, 36 (Ohio 1930) (noting that the “force,
authority, finality, and effectiveness of a verdict is wholly dependent upon the
judgment entered thereon by the court”); Bolin, 785 P.2d at 808 (“jurors under a
superior court judge’s control are county employees for purposes of the [Workers’
Compensation] Act”) (emphasis added).
102
See Evans, 60 P.2d at 226–27 (noting that jurors do not control matters they
may decide).
103
Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 243–44.
104
See Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 205, 206
(N.D. 1990) (noting that jurors are “autonomous” and concluding that jurors should
receive workers’ compensation coverage).
105
Compare Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 243 (“Obviously, a juror is not subject to
direction and control of county officials as to the manner in which the juror
discharges his duties, in the sense that an employee in an industry is subject to
direction by his employer. On the contrary, even the trial judge is expressly
forbidden to convey to the jury in any manner at any stage of the trial his opinion as
to how the jury should determine a question of fact.”), with Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at
205 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (“[A]lthough jurors must follow the
law as it is given by the court and apply only that law to the facts as the jurors find
them, within their own province, jurors are autonomous. [T]hey are given the power
of decision and are permitted to deliberate in secret and to announce their verdict
without giving reasons for it.”).
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workers’

Jurors’ Remuneration

When courts decide whether jurors should receive workers’
compensation, they often discuss the fact that jurors receive
remuneration for their service.107 Some courts said that, among
other reasons, jurors should receive workers’ compensation
because, like employees, they receive payment for their
services.108 Other courts, however, said that jurors should not
receive workers’ compensation because their payment differs
from the payment typically disbursed to employees.109 Indeed,
the latter courts distinguish juror remuneration from typical
employment remuneration because juror remuneration is
provided by statute,110 is not based on the number of hours
worked,111 only amounts to “some slight compensation,”112 and, in
some instances, jurors may continue to receive their salaries
from their regular employers while they serve.113
IV. THE REMEDY: LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION
The value of legislative clarification is apparent in light of
the existing jurisprudence on this issue. Most courts looked to
legislative intent to address the question of whether jurors
should receive workers’ compensation.114 Some of those courts
even held that the power to decide the issue was exclusively

106
Compare Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 244 (concluding that jurors should not receive
workers’ compensation coverage), with Holmgren, 454 N.W.2d at 205–06 (concluding
that jurors should receive workers’ compensation coverage).
107
See, e.g., Jeansonne v. Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 11663 (La. App. 1 Cir.
12/28/77); 354 So. 2d 619, 620; Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 203; Indus. Comm’n v.
Rogers, 171 N.E. 35, 37 (Ohio 1930).
108
See Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 203; Rogers, 171 N.E. at 37.
109
See Brouwer v. Metropolitan Dade County, 139 F.3d 817, 819 (11th Cir.
1998); Jeansonne, 354 So. 2d at 620; O’Malley’s Case, 281 N.E.2d 277, 279 (Mass.
1972).
110
Brouwer, 139 F.3d at 819.
111
Id.
112
Jeansonne, 354 So. 2d at 620.
113
O’Malley’s Case, 281 N.E.2d at 279.
114
E.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. Evans, 60 P.2d 225, 227 (Colo. 1936); Jaskoviak v.
Indus. Comm’n, 785 N.E.2d 1026, 1030 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Lockerman v. Prince
George’s County, 377 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Md. 1977).
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vested in their state legislatures.115 Accordingly, New York
courts would also look to its state legislature. However, because
the current statutory structure of New York’s Workers’
Compensation Act fails to expressly mention jurors, a New York
court confronted with this issue would face the daunting
challenge of trying to make sense of the existing out-of-state
jurisprudence, which is laden with inconsistencies. Indeed,
Barry Stevens’ future in the courts of New York would be
uncertain. In the interest of judicial economy, the legislature
ought to clarify and resolve this issue to spare the time and
expense the courts would otherwise incur in addressing this
issue. For the reasons that follow, the legislature should clarify
that jurors should not receive workers’ compensation.
A.

The Policy Behind the New York Workers’ Compensation
Statute Indicates that Jurors Should Not Be Covered

The Legislature should specify that jurors are not eligible for
workers’ compensation because that would comport with the
policy underlying the enactment of the workers’ compensation
statute—to mitigate the effects of widespread industrial
accidents.116 Accordingly, the New York Workers’ Compensation
Act currently reflects that policy by providing coverage to specific
categories of “[h]azardous employments.”117 Though it is possible
for jurors to sustain injuries in the course of their duties, that
possibility is too remote to qualify jury duty as “hazardous.”118 In
sum, because the Workers’ Compensation Act is meant to

115
See Evans, 60 P.2d at 227 (“The legislative branch of the government has not
said that a juror is an employee of the county, and it does not lie with the judicial
branch to belittle the functions of his great office by so declaring.”); Lockerman, 377
A.2d at 1184 (saying that whether jurors receive coverage is “a matter for legislative
determination”); Silagy v. State, 253 A.2d 478, 479 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969)
(noting that this issue “should be addressed, in the first instance, to the
Legislature”).
116
See Epstein, supra note 38, at 775–76; Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 406.
117
N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 3 (McKinney 2017).
118
See Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 526 (Idaho 1990) (noting that
likelihood of juror injuries is remote, even though substantial injuries are possible);
Lockerman, 377 A.2d at 1180 (stating that “simple common sense” suggests that
extending Workers’ Compensation coverage to jurors would the contravene the act’s
premise).
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respond to the frequency of injuries sustained in the course of
“hazardous” employments, allowing jurors to receive workers’
compensation coverage would be “manifestly absurd.”119
Moreover, allowing jurors to receive workers’ compensation
benefits would not only contravene the policy underlying
workers’ compensation, but also open the floodgates to further
amendments that do not comport with the policy behind the act.
That path could potentially lead to unlimited municipal liability.
Indeed, those in the performance of civic functions were “clearly
not contemplated by the Act” and the addition of coverage for
jurors might lead to coverage for election inspectors, bond
trustees, appraisers, and even “any person . . . called on for any
purpose. There would be no limit to those who could claim
against the count[ies].”120 Therefore, precluding jurors from
receiving workers’ compensation coverage would conform with
the policy supporting the Act and eliminate the possibility for the
opposite conclusion to contravene the Act.
B.

The Language of New York’s Workers’ Compensation Statute
Indicates that Jurors Should Not Be Covered

As previously stated, New York’s Workers’ Compensation
Act primarily grants coverage to employees that fall within
enumerated categories of “[h]azardous employments.”121 Not only
is jury work not hazardous, but it also fails to meet the statutory
definition of “employment.” New York’s Workers’ Compensation
Act provides that “employment” exists when a worker conducts
business for the employer’s “pecuniary gain.”122 It follows, then,
that jurors are not in an “employment” arrangement because
they do not act for the financial benefit of New York’s counties;
they serve a public or a civic duty.
As applied to municipalities, New York’s Workers’
Compensation Act contains a few exceptions to the statutory
requirement that “employment” must be for the employers’
pecuniary gain. Notably, those exceptions comport with the
119

See Lockerman, 377 A.2d at 1180.
Metropolitan Dade County v. Glassman, 341 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 1976)
(quoting Leon County v. Sauls, 9 So. 2d 461, 463 (Fla. 1942)).
121
N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 3 (McKinney 2017). Group 17, which lists the
employees that municipalities must cover, does not include jurors. Jurors could,
however, fit in to Group 19, which grants municipalities the option to provide
coverage to employees not listed in Group 17. Id.
122
Id. § 2 (McKinney 2017).
120
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underlying policy in a way that an exception for jurors would not.
The exceptions provide that (1) municipalities are required to
cover employees that work in a “prison reformatory, hospital for
the mentally ill or hospital maintained or operated by a
municipal corporation or other subdivision of the state,
notwithstanding the definitions of the terms ‘employment,’
‘employer’ or ‘employee’ ”;123 (2) municipalities are required to
cover county fire coordinators and deputy county fire
coordinators;124 (3) municipalities are required to cover county
sheriffs, undersheriffs, and sheriffs’ deputies, “notwithstanding
the definition of the term ‘employment’ ”;125 (4) municipalities are
required to cover civil defense volunteers, including rescue
squads and auxiliary firefighters, during the course of their
training;126 and (5) municipalities have the option to provide
auxiliary police officers with coverage, thereby bringing auxiliary
police officers within the statutory definition of “employment.”127
Certainly, providing coverage to prison employees, hospital
employees, fire coordinators, deputy fire coordinators, sheriffs,
undersheriffs, sheriffs’ deputies, volunteer rescue squad
members, auxiliary firefighters, and auxiliary police officers—all
of whom face threats to their life, health, and safety while at
work—complies with the underlying policy of protecting against
injuries sustained in the course of inherently hazardous work.
The work of jurors, on the other hand, is vastly different from
those excepted types of work and merits no such protection.
As applied to state employees, New York’s Workers’
Compensation Act contains a similar exception to the statutory
definition of “employment.” The statute provides coverage to
those under “[a]ny employment by the state, including the
employment of all elected and appointed public officers,
notwithstanding the definitions of the terms ‘employment,’
‘employer’ or ‘employee.’ ”128 The statute, however, restricts state
employee classification by providing that those “whose wages are
paid by . . . an employer other than the state . . . shall be deemed
123
Id. § 3 (McKinney 2017). The employees covered by the statute are
“keeper[s], guard[s], resident physician[s], nurse[s], interne[s], resident interne[s],
assistant resident interne[s] or orderl[ies].” Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. § 2 (McKinney 2017); id. § 3 (McKinney 2017).
128
Id. § 3 (McKinney 2017).
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an employee of . . . such employer other than the state . . . .”129 In
addition, New York law requires many employers to pay their
employees the daily $40 jury fee, much like a wage, when their
employees are summoned for jury duty.130 Applying these
principles, even if jurors, in their role as such, are generally
under “employment by the state,” many, if not most, jurors could
not qualify as state employees because their employers pay their
daily jury fee for the first three days.131
C.

The Chief Policy Arguments for Extending Workers’
Compensation Coverage to Jurors Are Without Merit

The policy arguments in favor of jurors receiving workers’
compensation are insufficient to merit juror coverage. There are
two chief policy arguments in support of extending workers’
compensation coverage to jurors. The first is that jurors should
receive workers’ compensation because, outside of workers’
compensation, jurors have no means to recover for their injuries
sustained as jurors; their claims are typically barred by judicial
immunity and municipal immunity.132
New York law contains both immunities. New York’s
municipal immunity shields public entities, including the
counties that summon jurors, from liability for discretionary
actions taken in the performance of governmental functions.133
Additionally, New York’s judicial immunity protects judges in the
performance of their judicial functions,134 and extends, in the
form of quasi-judicial immunity, to those who are “delegated
judicial or quasi-judicial functions,” because they are “integral
parts of the judicial process.”135
Under those doctrines, the court officials who direct, the
judges who oversee, and the counties that summon jurors are
immune from suit regarding injuries resulting from those

129

Id.
See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 519 (McKinney 2017) (requiring employers with ten or
more employees to pay the $40 fee for the first three days of service); id. at § 521.
131
See id. § 519; id. § 521 (McKinney 2017).
132
Bolin v. Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805, 806 (Wash. 1990).
133
Valdez v. City of New York, 960 N.E.2d 356, 361–62, 18 N.Y. 3d 69, 74–76,
936 N.Y.S.2d 587, 592–93 (N.Y. 2011).
134
Mosher-Simons v. County of Allegany, 783 N.E.2d 509, 512, 99 N.Y.2d 214,
218–20, 753 N.Y.S.2d 444, 447 (N.Y. 2002).
135
Id. at 512–13; 99 N.Y.2d at 220; 753 N.Y.S.2d at 447 (internal quotations
omitted).
130
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functions. Though those circumstances are unfortunate for
injured jurors, they do not warrant adding jurors as a class of
protected workers under workers’ compensation because the Act
is meant to protect against hazardous employment, and the work
of jurors is neither hazardous nor employment.136 Therefore,
even though injured jurors lack other means of recovery,137 they
cannot be eligible for workers’ compensation.
The second chief argument for extending workers’
compensation coverage to jurors is that providing coverage to
jurors is consistent with the legislatures’ broad intention to
liberally construe and apply workers’ compensation statutes.138
In fact, New York jurisprudence indicates that the state’s
Workers’ Compensation Act should be liberally construed.139 For
the reasons explained, however, permitting jurors to receive
workers’ compensation contravenes the policy underlying the
Act.140 Indeed, the liberal construction and purpose argument is
unpersuasive because, notwithstanding the policy of liberally
construing the Workers’ Compensation Act, the notion that
jurors should receive such coverage “disregard[s] [the] clear
meaning” of workers’ compensation.141 Put simply, even the most
liberal construction does not permit contravention of purpose.
D. The Remedy: A Specific Legislative Provision Precluding
Jurors from Workers’ Compensation Coverage
The suggested remedy is a simple one. The legislature
should specifically preclude jurors from workers’ compensation
coverage. In fact, the New York legislature has already done
136

See supra Part IV, Sections A–B.
This could change if the legislature creates a doctrine outside of Workers’
Compensation that provides for injured jurors’ medical expenses.
138
See Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 144 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995) (noting that covering jurors is “wholly consistent with the broad purposes
of the Act”) (emphasis added); Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 522 (Idaho
1990) (noting that Workers’ Compensation law was to be “liberally construed” and
saying the court’s task was, in pursuit of that end, “to ascertain if the provisions of
the [Workers’ Compensation] statute[] are capable of being so interpreted.”).
139
E.g., Neacosia v. N.Y. Power Auth., 649 N.E.2d 1188, 1191, 85 N.Y.2d 471,
476, 626 N.Y.S.2d 44, 47 (N.Y. 1995); Lemon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 528 N.E.2d
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that for other types of municipal workers. For example, the
portion of the statute that governs municipal employees provides
that Department of Sanitation employees “shall not be within the
coverage of this chapter.”142 The legislature need only add that
“jurors shall not be within the coverage of this chapter.”
Alternatively, the legislature could take an approach similar to
the one taken by Congress by specifying, in the definitions
section of the statute,143 that “employee” does not include those
“serving as a petit or grand juror.”144 Either way, the legislature
should properly and decisively settle the issue.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the New York legislature should add a
provision to the New York Workers’ Compensation Act that
specifically precludes jurors from coverage. That amendment
would comport with the policies underlying the Workers’
Compensation Act and potentially save the court system
considerable time and expense.
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144

See N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 3 (McKinney 2017).
N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 2 (McKinney 2017).
5 U.S.C. § 8101 (2012).

